Some political observers in the US believe that Donald Trump, the Republican presidential candidate, has essentially adopted a negative, oppositional stance toward Taiwan in recent months. “Trump gives Taiwan the Ukraine treatment” was the headline in Foreign policy In late July, after Trump claimed in an interview that Taiwan “gives us nothing” and has taken “about 100 percent of our chip business,” he said Taiwan “should pay us for (its) defense” and refused to make a clear commitment that America would defend Taiwan if the island were attacked or occupied by mainland China.
In the wake of the Republican Party platform adopted in mid-July, which contained no concrete statement on Taiwan’s fate, Trump’s critics (and even some of his supporters and acolytes) have expressed concern that his commitment to Taiwan may have waned in recent months. The party platform’s silence on Taiwan represents a notable departure from previous platforms, which explicitly stated that a Trump administration would come to Taiwan’s aid if its current status threatened to change.
Why this change? Even if Taiwan does not receive the “Ukraine treatment,” will a Trump presidency give the island the “Hong Kong treatment” and leave it at Beijing’s mercy? In late April, just weeks before Trump’s comments on Taiwan, Nikkei Asia reported that Asia experts predict that there will be an invasion or violation of Taiwanese territory by the mainland no later than 2027 – during the term of the next American president. Such reports have increased fears about Trump’s comments in the interview.
However, it must be emphasized that despite claims by Trump’s critics that he will abandon Taiwan and hand the island over to the Chinese Communist Party, other explanations are equally or even more plausible.
First, Trump has always taken a “transactional” approach to foreign policy. Trump is first and foremost a businessman who explicitly presents himself as a dealmaker. This attitude is the essential basis of his “America First” foreign policy. From this perspective, he is not “abandoning” Taiwan, but recalibrating relations. He wants Taiwan to pay more for American aid and loosen its microchip monopoly.
Trump’s transactional approach toward Taiwan runs counter to the beliefs of the China hawks who advised him during his first term, such as National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The middle ranks were also dominated by pro-war advisers (and strong pro-Taiwan advocates), such as Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, Randall Schriver, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, and Peter Navarro, the director of the Office of Trade and Industrial Policy.
This is the second reason why it is premature to jump to the conclusion that Trump is “giving up” on Taiwan. Over the past four years, Trump has increasingly insisted on being “his own boss” in foreign policy, surrounding himself with advisers who fully support his “America First” stance. The policy statements on Taiwan in the first two Republican party platforms were shaped by his advisers, particularly China hawks. His current position seems much closer to the position of “strategic ambiguity” historically favored by many, if not most, American politicians. Trump acknowledged this when asked what he would specifically do in the event of hostile mainland China toward Taiwan.
“I don’t want to give up my negotiating skills by giving such information to a reporter,” he replied.
Third, any comparisons between Trump’s attitudes toward Ukraine and Taiwan are false. The U.S. has not pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into Taiwan, nor is it supporting a war that it is funding with comparative financial support from Europe. Nor has Ukraine traditionally been a key U.S. ally, nor has it been a critical strategic geopolitical interest for the U.S. for decades. So Trump is not giving Taiwan the “Ukraine treatment,” but insisting that he will no longer turn a blind eye to what he sees as a longstanding “Taiwan First” policy under which the U.S. has—as he sees it—supported Taiwan without sufficient consideration for American economic interests. In fact, Trump’s attitude toward Ukraine suggests that he is strongly supportive of Taiwan. “We need to end this (war) quickly,” he said of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, “so that America can focus on the real problem, which is China.”
Supporters of Trump’s “rebalance” on Taiwan point out that from the beginning to the end of his term, he demonstrated, both symbolically and through concrete actions, how he is likely to behave if returned to power. For example, in December 2016, shortly before taking office, President-elect Trump had an unprecedented, widely reported phone call with Taiwan’s newly elected President Tsai Ing-wen. It was the first time in 37 years that an American president (or president-elect) had spoken to the Taiwanese president. Trump maintained close relations with Taiwan throughout his term, and at the end of his presidency in October 2020, he arranged a major $1.8 billion arms sale to Taiwan, including high-tech missile and launch systems. That same week, China retaliated by imposing heavy sanctions on U.S. arms manufacturers such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing in an attempt to pressure Trump to reverse course and cancel the planned arms sale to Taiwan. Not only did he refuse to do so, but in the weeks that followed he went even further and lifted all restrictions on direct communications with Taiwan.
The people of Taiwan have long been strong supporters of Donald Trump – and vice versa, as evidenced by his phone call with President Tsai before he took office as well as his decision four years later to lift all barriers to official communication with Taiwan (which have since been reinstated by the Biden administration).
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I have lived in Taiwan, taught at the National Academy of Humanities in Taipei, and taught foreign languages at one of the country’s leading universities – in Tunghai, Taiwan’s third-largest city. I have long been struck by the overwhelming enthusiasm for Trump among most of the island’s citizens. This enthusiasm is even evident in universities and other elites. In the US, you will not find a liberal arts department at any major university that is not vigorously hostile to Trump, giving him at most five to ten percent support. In Taiwan, the opposite is true: a majority of citizens support Trump. This is obviously due to his open and frequent criticism of mainland China – but also to his willingness to take daring risks, as both the phone call with President Tsai and the major arms package in 2020 demonstrated.
This solid relationship between Trump and Taiwan did not break down over a mere interview in which Trump made a few critical remarks about U.S.-Taiwan relations. In fact, his choice of Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio as his vice presidential running mate—who is also a vocal critic of China and a sympathetic supporter of Taiwan—only serves to cement that relationship. Moreover, Trump’s advisers were quick to point out that when Trump made those offhand remarks during the July interview, he was likely not fully aware that Taiwan currently pays for most of its arms imports from U.S. companies. Moreover, they note, what was overlooked by his critics was that Trump expressed great admiration for the citizens of Taiwan in the interview. “I know the people (of Taiwan) very well and respect them very much.” This was the context, he clarified, for his remark that Taiwan has taken “about 100 percent of our chip business”—he admires the entrepreneurial spirit of the Taiwanese people. Still, he said, it’s time to rebalance the relationship and move away from what I call an American willingness to pursue a “Taiwan First” policy.
In my view, Trump’s record in his first term is the best indicator of his behavior toward Taiwan in a second term. Although his thinking is no longer dominated by a group of outspoken China critics, he remains a vocal critic of mainland China and an admirer of Taiwan and its people.
